This category includes blog articles on a range of themes in Confucian philosophy and history. Some of these pieces have been used in my teaching, while others are written for a general audience. Together, they survey major periods and regions in the Confucian tradition. Due to website maintenance, the posts were not created or published in chronological order. I recommend using the sidebar search function to locate specific themes.
I created these posters to present a brief history of Confucianism in China. It includes major figures, events, and periods of history for beginning learners of Confucianism to understand its history in China.
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In my effort to promote Ruism among ordinary American people I have encountered a major push-back from, of all people, Chinese Americans. Most of them are either indifferent or hostile to their own tradition. But regardless of the reason, an unvarnished ignorance underlies this opposition. A recent example took place this summer when I gave a talk to the largest Chinese evangelical Christian church in the Boston area about ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues.’ After I finished my talk, a pious Chinese woman, around 40 years old, came up and whispered to me: “I know Ruism was the dominant tradition of ancient China, but I had never heard anything like what you were saying during your talk. After hearing what you have explained about Ruism, I find that it is actually quite good (挺好的).” Anecdotes like this tell us that in comparison with other traditions such as Judaism, Hinduism or Roman Catholicism, most Chinese immigrants to the United States are actually an obstacle, rather than an aid, to introducing and advancing their supposed ‘home tradition’ to other Americans.
So, why is this happening? Where does this ignorance come from? As a scholar of the humanities, I have to assign the major reason to the May Fourth Movement and the radical anti-Ruist rhetoric which, in the 1910s, this movement created and afterwards was used in governing most of modern China’s public education. What happened was that, facing a national defeat by the Western colonial powers, some radically westernized Chinese intellectuals such as Lu Xun or Chen Duxiu, whom I call ‘The May Fourthers,’ invented a dualistic mindset separating East from West, and old from new. In order, they said, to surpass the West, China must give up its own culture and re-learn everything Western. For this reason, Ruist teachings such as ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ were condemned by the May Fourthers as representing the backward morals of a feudal society. They said that these ideas were hopelessly authoritarian, enslaved the independent will and spiritual freedom of individual people, and weakened Chinese cultural vitality. As a consequence, they thought, Chinese tradition must be completely jettisoned so that the Chinese people can learn the new morality of the West.
Although I appreciate the apparent sincerity of the May Fourthers’ intentions (they, after all, hoped to make China better and stronger), I nevertheless see that their racial, anti-Ruist rhetoric is as ridiculous as to say, for example, “A wise old man, punched in the face by an impetuous young guy, has to totally give up his own wisdom and identify spiritually with the young guy.” In fact, most of the May Fourthers’ criticisms of Ruism are simply wrong! In my view, in order to practice ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues,’ nothing more is needed than the independent spirit of individuals! In the remaining sections of this essay, I will demonstrate how this is the case.
First, a little history:
The first time that the single phrase ‘the Three Guides and the Five Constant Virtues’ (三綱五常) is mentioned in the Ruist classics was when Ma Rong (馬融, 79-166 CE) in the Eastern Han Dynasty used this phrase to comment on Analects 2:23 in order to explain the unchanging aspect of a harmonious human society. According to Ma, regardless of what happens on the outside, people must still practice Ruist ethics inwardly for human society to remain on the right track. Before Ma, it was Dong Zhongshu’s (董仲舒, 179-104 BCE) works and a later text entitled, ‘A Comprehensive Exposition in White Tiger Hall’ (白虎通義, compiled in 79 CE) that provided a separate philosophical exposition to each of the terms ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues’. As perhaps will be well known, the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) was a very special period for Ruism. After other teachings, such as Legalism and Daoism, had proved not to be robust enough for maintaining a unified dynasty and an harmonious human society, Ruism was established as the state ideology. Accordingly, we can see that all those expositions about ‘the Three Guides’ and ‘the Five Constant Virtues’ which were provided by the Han Dynasty Ruists are actually a distillation of previous Ruist ethical teachings such as ‘The Five Cardinal Human Relationships‘ (五倫) and ‘The Ten Reciprocal Duties‘ (十義) from Ruism’s Pre-Qin classical period. These teachings were intended to function, and they actually did function, as a textbook version of Ruist ethics, and thus were perennially influential. In this sense, the May Fourthers were right to select these Guides and Virtues [三綱 and 五常] as representative of Ruist ethics, even though their understanding of these ideas was quite wrong.
Second, the philosophy:
The standard expression for ‘The Three Guides’ is that ‘The ruler is the guide for subjects, the father is the guide for the son, and the husband is the guide for the wife’ (君為臣綱, 父為子綱, 夫為妻綱).
The original meaning of the Chinese character, written 綱 gang, refers to the lead rope of a fishing net, and thus, by extension, it means guide, guideline, bond, or guiding principle, etc. In Ruist ethics, if X is said to be the guide (綱) for Y, it primarily connotes, first, that the relationship of X to Y is a major human relationship, and secondly, that this X-Y relationship is, in a practical sense, hierarchical, in which X takes the major and leading role while Y takes a minor and subordinate role. Therefore, both X and Y must fulfill those distinct duties which are entailed by their differing roles.
So, if X guides (綱 ) Y, it means that X must act as a moral model for Y. In other words, X has a great responsibility for instructing Y about right human behavior. In the subordinate role of Y, he or she needs to show consistent deference towards and thus, discreetly and responsibly follow X as long as a normal X-Y relationship is being maintained. Even so, to what extent can an X-Y relationship be seen as ‘normal’? The answer depends. The tradition tells us that for the ruler-subjects relationship, if a ruler continues to act badly, a minister ought to leave the state or resign after remonstration has failed three times. In more extreme cases, such as when a ruler proves to be a ruthless tyrant, revolt is urged. In the father-son relationship, if a father commits misdeeds and refuses to correct himself after his son has remonstrated three times, his son should ‘follow his father while crying and weeping’ (號泣而隨之, 禮記). This implies a persistent duty of the son to remonstrate since the father-son relationship can’t be abandoned as easily as that of ruler-subjects. For the husband-wife relationship, if a husband’s wrongdoing concerns only minor issues, the wife ought to tolerate while continuing to remonstrate, but if the misbehavior is really brutal such as killing the wife’s parents and other similar deeds that violate basic principles of human relationships, the wife has the right to a divorce (誖逆人倫，殺妻父母，廢絕綱紀，亂之大者。義絕，乃得去也”, 白虎通義).
Therefore, if there is anything that the teaching of ‘The Three Guides’ suggests to which a human being must be subordinated, it is only to one’s duties and to the universal moral principles that are entailed by each person’s distinct roles within various human relationships, rather than to any capricious human person who unjustly happens to hold authority. In relation to this, Xunzi taught us to “follow the Dao, rather than the ruler; to follow what is right, rather than the father.” If a person’s will is not firm, or if a person’s spirituality is not independent and principled, I want to ask the May Fourthers, “How could anyone be a Ruist who follows such teachings?”
The ethics of ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ is higher than those which concern ‘The Three Guides’, ‘The Five Cardinal Relationships’, or ‘The Ten Reciprocal Duties’. This is because these latter terms refer to concrete human relationships and their related duties, but meanwhile, human society is far more complex than what these terms refer to. Even when we know how to behave ourselves within three (or five) major human relationships, we still feel the need for a higher principle that can guide all human relationships. Therefore, the purpose of teaching ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ is to provide that ‘single’ principle which will apply in various occasions. These ‘Five Constant Virtues’ are Humaneness (仁, ren), Righteousness (義, yi), Ritual-Propriety (禮, li), Wisdom (智, zhi) and Trustworthiness (信, xin). I will explain these terms one by one.
The basic meaning of ‘Humaneness’ (仁, ren) is love. Ruism’s conception of love is all-encompassing. It can be as close by as one’s parents and one’s children, or in its incipient form, in the reaction one has when, seeing a baby about to fall into a well, one feels a sense of ‘commiseration’ (惻隱之心, Mencius) and is hardly able to prevent oneself from saving the baby. It can also be as distant as when tiles and stones are crushed and one feels concern and empathy for their reordering (Wang Yangming). In a word, the Ruist conception of human love is so universal that a person of humaneness is said to be able to ‘form one body with a myriad of things between Heaven and Earth.’
Nevertheless, even though human love is universal, Ruism also urges its particularization, so here we are with the virtue of ‘Righteousness’ (義, yi). The basic meaning of 義 refers to something that ‘ought’ to be done, that is, to what is right. In relation to ‘Humaneness,’ this virtue requires human beings to love appropriately in relation to particular people and in concrete situations. For example, as human beings, our love towards our own parents and children is naturally and understandably more intense than towards other people’s parents and children. However, love should not end with one’s own family. We must love other people’s parents and their children by extending our love outward from our own. In this regard, Ruism teaches us to correctly determine the value of one’s various relationships, and thus to bring about a graded form of dynamic harmony in one’s performance of various duties through a reasonable distribution of time and energy.
‘Ritual-Propriety’ (禮, li) refers to the audible and visible ways of human behavior, through which what the virtues of ‘Humaneness’ and ‘Righteousness’ require are practiced. For example, if one has good intentions to appropriately love one’s parents but does not actually practice the respectful ways for speaking, looking, hugging, or taking good care, it is hard to say that one has internalized the virtues of humaneness and righteousness in his or her person.
The virtue of Wisdom (智, zhi) balances the virtue of ‘Ritual-Propriety’ since it refers to knowledge. To know how to appropriately love is to possess wisdom. In line with the Ruist idea of dynamic harmony, the central task of human wisdom is to be thought of as knowing both the facts and values of things, and thus, of understanding how things in concrete situations can fit together based upon appropriate human reactions to that situation.
The virtue of Trustworthiness (信, xin) is mainly about one’s attitude, and thus, has no additional content compared to the other four. It requires that one sincerely practice the four aforementioned virtues, and thus really possess them (實有其德).
In a word, ‘Humaneness’ is universal human love, ‘Righteousness’ refers to how to love appropriately in concrete terms, ‘Ritual-Propriety’ is the audible and visible ways of human behavior in which ‘Humaneness’ and ‘Righteousness’ are practiced, ‘Wisdom’ is to know how to be humane, righteous, and ritually-proper using one’s deep axiological reasoning, while ‘Trustworthiness’ urges one to be sincere in the practice of these virtues, and thus, to truly own them. Overall, ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ is the principle that governs one’s behavior within various human relationships. For example, if a minister can be humane, righteous, ritually-proper, wise, and trustworthy in his or her behavior within the ruler-subjects relationship, he or she will be seen as fulfilling his or her duty of ‘loyalty’, as specified in the teaching of ‘Ten Reciprocal Duties’.
Based on this discussion, I have to ask one final question: Can we still believe, as the May Fourthers did, that the Ruist teachings of ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ represent the backward morals of a feudal society and thus are totally irrelevant to modern society? Absolutely not. In my view, every virtue listed in ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ continues to be extremely valuable for our time. Nothing need be changed in order to practice this teaching today. For ‘The Three Guides,’ we only need to make minor changes in order to adjust its social context. As I have argued in a previous essay, the ruler-subjects relationship ought to be understood as that of government-citizens, or any other hierarchical relationship in public life; the father-son relationship needs to be reformulated as that of parents-children; and the teaching about the husband-wife relationship ought to be reconsidered as one of a husband and wife who are guides for each other depending upon their differing levels of expertise. In my view, each of these adjustments is what the Ruist ethical principle of ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ requires for today’s human relationships.
In a word, I believe the teachings of ‘The Three Guides’ and ‘The Five Constant Virtues’ are still key for the realization of social harmony in every time period. May Fourthers, I have to say again, “Sorry, you were wrong. It is the Ruist tradition which is the antidote for our modern malaise!”
(This article was once published in Huffpost, November 2017: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-stirring-ghost-of-chen-duxiu-1879-1942-ce-needs_b_59fa0817e4b09afdf01c3fb0.)
Although Ruism (Confucianism) is experiencing a powerful revival in mainland China and is consequently radiating across Asia and other parts of the world, a suspicion towards it still haunts many people’s mind. This can be seen in frequent reports in English news cycles which either ignore or misrepresent the basics of Ruism. For example, these reports usually present profiles of Ruism containing ideas such as: the Ruist idea of “filial piety” (Xiao) requires blind obedience of children to their parents; Ruism is essentially an ideology of feudal society used by authoritarian governments to manipulate their political power; Ruism oppresses women and other gender minorities; Ruist education stifles creativity, etc.
These attacks, issued by people with limited knowledge of Ruism, are neither true nor new. They share one common point of origin: Chen Duxiu and the so-called May Fourth and New Cultural Movement in the 1910s of China. The movement was launched by radical anti-Ruism Chinese intellectuals who accused it of anything and everything wrong with traditional China. For these intellectuals, Chinese people needed to completely replace their Ruism-hardwired thought with Western thought in order to keep China from being conquered and eliminated by Western colonial powers. Therefore, I must conclude that the greatest obstacle to the contemporary revival of Ruism is that the ghost of Chen Duxiu still stirs in the world.
Chen Duxiu was by far the most impactful anti-Ruist intellectual in the May Fourth and New Cultural Movement. He created the movement’s leading journal of “New Youth 新青年” in the 1910s to champion and propagate the Western ideas of “democracy” and “science”, which he thought of as representing the apex of human civilization. He founded the first communist group in China in the 1920s, and acted as the most powerful political leader of the Chinese Communist Party in its early stage. Most importantly, unlike many contemporary intellectuals who regretted their anti-Ruism thoughts in their elder years, Chen Duxiu’s anti-Ruist stance remained unchanged until his death. As a result, Mao Zedong recognized that Chen Duxiu had played a decisive role in transforming Chinese society from backwards feudalism to modern capitalism and then, ultimately, to a coming “brave new world” of socialism. Mao, in 1919, stated: “May Master Chen Duxiu’s utterly firm and absolutely sublime spirit live for thousands of years!” and in 1942 recognized him as “the Commander-in-Chief of May Fourth Movement.”[1] In hindsight, it is not surprising why Mao had such a high evaluation of Chen Duxiu, which was a rare occurrence for Mao’s contemporary intellectuals at the time. It was Chen Duxiu who helped to introduce Mao to communist thought from the Soviet Union, and it was also Chen Duxiu who finally converted the young Mao (in his late 20s) into a staunch believer in communism.
Therefore, as seeded in Chen Duxiu’s provocative journal essays in the 1910s and approved by Mao, and as a central ideology of the Chinese Community Party until the 1980s, the radical anti-Ruist thought ran consistently throughout most of the history of China in the 20th century.
Nevertheless, for our understanding of Ruism’s contemporary revival, a crucial philosophical question remains to be asked: Is Chen Duxiu’s anti-Ruism correct?
Triggered by the deteriorating conditions of the late Qing dynasty (1644-1911 C.E), and also inspired by social Darwinism, Chen Duxiu held an extremely dualistic view between pre-modernity and modernity, between the East and the West. Chen viewed Ruism as essentially a pre-modern, feudal, system of thought which had nothing in common with “science” and “democracy”, the two central tenets of modern human civilization. Unfortunately, in the remaining part of this essay, we will see that Chen Duxiu’s anti-Ruist arguments were neither accurate nor self-coherent.
When Chen Duxiu talked about democracy, he mainly referred to the European Enlightenment philosophers, such as Rousseau and his theory of social contract, which inspired the French Revolution and led to the establishment of the modern French republic. According to Chen Duxiu, France’s great democratic achievement was based upon those Enlightenment philosophers’ unflinching defense of the autonomous and free use of human reason, and the accordingly inalienable political and social human rights of each individual.
In contrast, Chen Duxiu viewed the traditional Ruist ethical teaching of the “Three Bonds 三綱” (between rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, and husbands and wives) as incompatible with these democratic moral values. In Chen’s mind, the Ruist ethic of the “Three Bonds” requires that persons of a lower rank blindly obey those of a higher rank and, therefore, it is essentially an ethic designed to enslave, allowing the elite to misuse their authority and solidify an unjustifiable feudal hierarchy.
Chen Duxiu’s argument is wrong on at least two fronts. First, it is unwarranted to identify the ethic of the “Three Bonds” as representing the essence of Ruism. The doctrine of the “Three Bonds” was formulated in Dong Zhongshu’s Chunqiu fanlu (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals) and Ban Gu’s Baihutongyi (A General Discourse on the Meeting at White Dragon) in the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.E – 220 C.E). These Ruist thinkers distilled all relevant elements of pre-Han Chinese thought in an attempt to adjust Ruism to a new political and social situation. In other words, this ethic didn’t even exist in any pre-Qin classical Ruist text (including the well-known Analects of Confucius and Mencius). Since this is the case, it is impossible to use the ethic to epitomize Ruism. Second, even if we can take the “Three Bonds” as a sort of essential Ruist ethical teaching, neither of the texts mentioned above ever taught that ministers, children, or wives should “blindly obey” their counterparts. In actuality, the Ruist ethic of the “Three Bonds” requires that, although someone usually takes a leadership role, all persons have a particular role to play and a special responsibility to fulfill in order to maximize the benefits of everyone involved in a particular relationship. This includes moments when a person in a lower political or social rank sees someone of a higher rank do something wrong, the person is obliged to denounce and rectify it in an appropriate and efficient way. Accordingly, a great portion of the two aforementioned texts are dedicated to exploring effective ways for ministers, children, and wives to “remonstrate” (谏) against their counterparts’ wrong doing. From today’s perspective, it is indeed inappropriate to conceive of the relationship between husband and wife as hierarchical. However, if we focus on the social situation when the ethic was formulated and promoted, we will find that it conveys a perennial wisdom on how to deal with human relationships: no matter who we are, in whatever relationship, we need to follow rules, abide by virtue and, thus, fulfill a responsibility to bring maximum harmony to all parties involved. Quite obviously, the implementation of this ethic requires strong individuality in the sense that each individual needs to learn, manage, and discipline themselves in order to recognize and rectify potentially harmful behaviors in their counterparts, thus creating a sustainable condition of social harmony.
In this sense, Chen Yinque (1890-1969 C.E), a great historian and contemporary of Chen Duxiu, once acclaimed the ethic of the “Three Bonds” as representing the best of ancient Chinese ethical wisdom, as it champions individuals’ “independent spirit and free thought 獨立之精神，自由之思想” within varying human relationships. In other words, the “Three Bonds” ethic was not designed for slaves. Its Ruist kernel expresses a commitment of knowledgeable and conscientious individuals, i.e., the noble-minded Ruist persons (junzi), to moral autonomy and social harmony.
Chen Duxiu’s misunderstanding of the “Three Bonds” and his misjudgment on the incompatibility of Ru ethics with democratic values are also evidenced in his understanding of “science.” Chen’s idea of science as the second pillar of modern civilization was influenced by Auguste Comte’s positivism and Karl Marx’s materialist philosophy of history. He thought there are rules and laws governing natural and social phenomena, and in reliance upon scientific methods(such as the one of induction), Chen Duxiu believed that humans can generalize these rules and laws so as to make the subjective mind correspond to objective reality. This surely requires human individuals to freely use their reason to critically think of any established knowledge so that human science can be continually improved upon to become more and more able to map objective reality.
Ironically, although once lavishly lampooning traditional Ruist scientific naiveté towards the objective natural world in his early essays written in the 1910s, Chen Duxiu concluded his life-long anti-Ruism thinking in his last article on the theme of Confucius in 1937 in this way: because Confucius’ ethical teachings do not include any idea of ghosts, spirits or deities, his thought is in line with the spirit of critical thinking as embodied in the European Enlightenment which challenged the religious authority of the Roman Catholic church. Therefore, Chen acknowledged that Confucius’ thought may be helpful for Chinese people to accept Western science. However, because of the existence of the Ruist ethic of the “Three Bonds,” Chen Duxiu still thought Ruism was incompatible with “democracy” and, thus, Ru thought would be utterly useless in helping the Chinese people to embrace democratic values [2].
Nevertheless, the process of political negotiation in a modern democratic polity actually shares the same commitment to critical thinking and social collaboration as the process of rational criticism in any modern scientific project. In this sense, the values of “democracy” and “science” are generally closely tied together so that neither can function well apart from the other. In this way, Chen Duxiu’s final conclusion of Ruism’s compatibility with modern science and of its incompatibility with modern democratic values is incoherent in and of itself.
In brief, Chen Duxiu’s radical anti-Ruism attitude, which was emblematic of other key participants in the May Fourth and New Cultural Movement, was historically ungrounded and philosophically unwarranted. As a proponent of Ruism’s contemporary revival, I believe that Ruism, as a comprehensive and profound way of living, furnishes great wisdom to enable people around the world to positively engage modern life, and to perfect modern human civilization into a more desired form. In the face of all the “fake news” on Ruism, rooted in the radical anti-Ruist movement in the 1910s in China, we have to say: the ghost of Chen Duxiu needs to take a rest.
[1] 《毛泽东早期文稿》，长沙：湖南人民出版社，2008，279-282. 《毛泽东文集》（第3卷），北京：人民出版社，1996, 289.
[2] 陈独秀，“孔子与中国”，《陈独秀著作选》（第2卷），上海人民出版社，1993, 232.
(Editor: Don Li)
Introduction:
I translate and annotate Zhu Xi’s “On Ren” to show how Zhu Xi understood the cardinal human virtue of Ren (仁, humaneness). In my view, this is one of the most comprehensive explanation of the virtue Ren in Ruism.
仁說
天地以生物為心者也。而人物之生，又各得夫天地之心以為心者也。故語心之德，雖其總攝貫通，無所不備，然一言以蔽之，則曰仁而已矣。請試詳之：
蓋天地之心，其德有四，曰元亨利貞，而元無不統；其運行焉，則為春夏秋冬之序，而春生之氣無所不通。故人之為心，其德亦有四，曰仁義禮智，而仁無所不包；其發用焉，則為愛恭宜別之情，而惻隱之心無所不貫。故論天地之心者，則曰乾元、坤元，則四德之體用不待悉數而足； 論人心之妙者，則曰“仁，人心也”，則四德之體用亦不待遍舉而該。
蓋仁之為道，乃天地生物之心，即物而在。情之未發，而此體已具；情之既發，而其用不窮。誠能體而存之，則眾善之源、百行之本莫不在是。此孔門之教所以必使學者汲汲於求仁也。
其言有曰：“克己復禮為仁”，言能克去己私，復乎天理，則此心之體無不在，而此心之用無不行也。 又曰：“居處恭，執事敬，與人忠”，則亦所以存此心也。 又曰：“事親孝，事兄弟，及物恕”，則亦所以行此心也。
又曰：“求仁得仁”，則以讓國而逃，諫伐而餓，為能不失乎此心也。
又曰：“殺身成仁”，則以欲甚於生，惡甚於死，為能不害乎此心也。此心何心也？在天地則坱然生物之心，在人則溫然愛人利物之心，包四德而貫四端者也。
或曰：“若子之言，則程子所謂愛情仁性，不可以愛為仁者非與？”曰：“不然。程子之所訶，以愛之發而名仁者也。吾之所論，以愛之理而名仁者也。蓋所謂情性者，雖其分域之不同，然其脈絡之通，各有攸屬者，則曷嘗判然離絕而不相管哉？吾方病夫學者誦程子之言而不求其意，遂至於判然離愛而言仁，故特論此以發明其遺意，而子顧以為異乎程子之說，不亦誤哉？”
或曰：“程氏之徒言仁多矣，蓋有謂愛非仁，而以萬物與我為一，為仁之體者矣；亦有謂愛非仁，而以心有知覺，釋仁之名者矣。今子之言若是，然則彼皆非與？”
曰：“彼謂物我為一者，可以見仁之無不愛矣，而非仁之所以為體之真也。彼謂心有知覺者，可以見仁之包乎智矣，而非仁之所以得名之實也。觀孔子答子貢博施濟眾之問，與程子所謂覺不可以訓仁者，則可見矣，子尚安得復以此而論仁哉 ? 抑泛言同體者，使人含胡昏緩而無警切之功，其弊或至於認物為己者有之矣；專言知覺者，使人張皇迫躁而無沈潛之味，其弊或至於認欲為理者有之矣。一忘一助，二者蓋胥失之。而知覺之雲者，於聖門所示樂山能守之氣象尤不相似，子尚安得復以此而論仁哉？”
因並記其語，作《仁說》。(《朱子全書》二十四册)
On Ren (仁)
The being of Heaven and Earth consists in creativity. When things and people come into existence, they are endowed by Heaven and Earth with their natures. Because of this, the human mind-heart—within which human nature is embodied—has virtues which embrace all, penetrate all and thus, lack nothing. Nevertheless, one word can sum them up: Ren (仁, humaneness). Let me try to explain in detail.
There are four virtues for the creativity of Heaven and Earth: initiation, permeation, harmonization, and integration. The virtue of initiation governs them all (i). In their operation, these virtues are manifested in the four seasons—the vital-energy of spring permeates them all (ii).
Correspondingly, there are four virtues for the human mind-heart: Ren, righteousness, ritual-propriety, and wisdom—the virtue of Ren embraces them all. When these virtues come forth and function, they are manifested in the human feelings of love, obligation, respect, and judiciousness—the feeling of commiseration pervades them all (iii).
Therefore, when discussing the creativity of Heaven and Earth, if we simply say, “the initiative power of Qian (Heaven), the initiative power of Kun (Earth),” then its four virtues and their functions are encapsulated.
For discussing the magnificence of the human mind-heart, if we simply say, “Ren is what the human mind-heart is,” then its four virtues and their functions are summarized (iv).
So, the virtue of Ren is actually what the human mind-heart—which is produced and sustained by the creativity of Heaven and Earth—consists in. It functions when the human mind-heart engages with things. When feelings are not aroused, the virtue is already there. When feelings are aroused, it functions inexhaustibly.
If we can sincerely embody and preserve the virtue of Ren, then we have in it the fountain of all goodness and the root of all deeds. This is why the teachings of the Confucian school (Ruism) urge scholars to pursue, keenly and unceasingly, the virtue of Ren.
Ruism teaches, “Master oneself and return to ritual-propriety.”(v) This means, if we can eliminate selfishness, and recover the principle of Tian within ourselves, then this mind-heart will reach everywhere and its function will always be operative.
It also teaches, “Be respectful when you are at home, be dedicated when you work, and be trustworthy when dealing with people.”(vi) These are ways to preserve this mind-heart.
It also teaches: “Be filial when serving parents, be discreetly obedient when serving elder brothers, and be empathetic when engaging with all kinds of things.”(vii) These are ways to practice this mind-heart.
It also teaches: “(Bo Yi and Shu Qi) sought Ren and then, they found it.” (viii) This teaching is about Bo Yi, who declined a throne and left the state in favor of his younger brother Shu Qi. The brothers also remonstrated against King Wu’s rebellious expedition, and after failing to persuade him, they chose to starve to death. That they were determined to do this is because they didn’t lose this mind-heart. (ix)
It also teaches, “Sacrifice life in order to accomplish Ren.”(x) This implies that we desire something more than life and hate something more than death in order not to injure this mind-heart. What is this mind-heart all about? It is rooted in the all-encompassing creativity of Heaven and Earth, and in the human world, this mind-heart loves people and nurtures things. It incorporates the four virtues (i.e., Ren, righteousness, ritual-propriety, and wisdom) and bonds together the four moral incipient sprouts (i.e., the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and disgust, the feeling of deference, and the feeling of distinguishing right and wrong) (xi) .
Someone asked: “According to your words, is it not wrong for Master Cheng (xii) to say that love is a particular feeling while Ren is the human nature and therefore, love should not be regarded as Ren?”
I answer, “Not so. What Master Cheng criticized was to use the human status when the feeling of love is aroused to portray what is Ren per se. What I argued is to use the principle of love to portray Ren per se. For human nature and human feelings—although they belong to different existential spheres—connect to each other like arteries and veins in the same body (xiii). How can they become sharply separated and have nothing to do with each other? Scholars recite Master Cheng’s words without understanding their meaning to the extent that they even talk about Ren as being something separate from love. I worry about this, and therefore, made the above exposition in order to reveal the lost meaning of Master Cheng’s teaching. You think of my view as divergent from Master Cheng, isn’t this wrong?”
Someone asked, “The followers of Master Cheng have given many explanations of Ren. Some say that love is not Ren, and regard the oneness of all things and one’s self as what is Ren per se. Others maintain that love is not Ren, but explain Ren in terms of awareness possessed by the mind-heart (xvi). If what you say is correct, are they all wrong?”
I answer, “From what they call the oneness of all things and one’s self, it can be known that Ren involves love for all, but this oneness is not what is Ren per se. From the fact that the mind-heart possesses awareness, it can be seen that the virtue of Ren includes wisdom, but this is not how the Ren per se can be named. If you look up Kongzi’ answer to (his pupil) Zi Gong’s question whether conferring extensive benefits on and thus, helping all the people will constitute Ren (xv) and also Master Cheng’s view that Ren ought not to be construed in terms of awareness, you will see the point. How can you still explain Ren in these terms?
“Furthermore, if the oneness of things and one’s self is superficially talked of, that will lead people to be indistinct and inattentive so that no effort is made to keep alert. The harmful effect—and there has been—may be to mistake exterior things for one’s own self. If Ren is construed in the specific term of awareness, that will lead people to be anxious, impatient, and impetuous so that the process of moral self-cultivation lacks depth. The harmful effect—and there has been—may be to mistake one’s desire as moral principle. In the first case, the mind-heart is oblivious, but in the second case, the mind-heart is agitated and disturbed. Both are wrong. Further, as for the construal of Ren in terms of awareness, this view is especially incongruent with Kongzi’ teachings that a person of Ren has the temperament of loving mountain (xvi) and that only the virtue of Ren can preserve what human knowledge has been aware of (xvii). How then can you still explain Ren in this way?”
It is because of all this that I record their questions and compose this essay on Ren.
Notes:
(i) Tian (天, heaven) is an all-encompassing constantly creative cosmic power. Its creativity has four generic features: (1) Tian creates the world from nothing and initiates the world as a process of continual creation, and in this sense, Tian’s creativity is initiative (元, yuan). (2) Tian creates everything, so Tian’s creativity is permeative (亨, heng). (3) Everything created by Tian is and becomes together within Tian, so Tian’s creativity is harmonizing (利, li). (4) Tian creates the world as a whole, and also, every creature is endowed with a nature to integrate itself, so Tian’s creativity is integrative (貞, zhen). These four basic features of Tian’s creativity are called by Zhu Xi its four ‘virtues’ (德, de). Also, Zhu Xi uses “Heaven and Earth” to refer to Tian. This is legitimate, because seeing from the human perspective, Tian is manifested as two parts: heaven and earth. Tian’s creativity is accordingly manifested in the co-creativity of heaven and earth. Furthermore, Zhu Xi thought the virtue of “initiation” governs all other virtues. This is because without the initiative power of Tian, there would be no world, and as a consequence, all other generic features of Tian’s creativity would lose their ground. Zhu Xi’s thought is based upon the statement of the hexagram for Hexagram Qian in the Classics of Change (易經): “元,亨, 利, 貞”.
(ii) Principle (理, li) and Vital-energy (氣, qi) is a basic dyad of categories in Zhu Xi’s thought, which is arguably comparable to the one of Form and Matter in Greek philosophy. The most generic features of the four virtues of Tian’s creativity are referred to by Zhu Xi as the “Principle of Tian” (天理) in the later part of the essay. These principles of Tian are manifested in the action of the cosmic vital-force during the course of four seasons.
(iii) The feeling of commiseration (惻隱之心, the Mencius 2A), according to Mencius, is what one spontaneously feels when one sees a baby about to fall into a well. For Mencius, this is the moral incipient sprout of the cardinal human virtue of Ren, which Mencius thinks is what human nature is all about. For Zhu Xi, he maintains Mencius’s thought and thinks that the feeling of commiseration is also one incipient form of the human feeling of universal love. However, in a more delicate way than Mencius, Zhu Xi furthermore grounds the feeling of love upon the virtue of Ren, and then, in turn, grounds the virtue of Ren upon the all-encompassing creativity of Tian.
(iv) Here we encounter another basic dyad of categories in Ruism: Ti (体, living-substance) and Yong (用, function). The ti of a thing is what the thing per se consists in, while its yong is one thing’s manifested functions when it engages with other things. For example, using Zhu Xi’s example in his other works, the ti of an ear is the ear itself as one organ of human body, while the yong of an ear is its ability to hear. In the context of this essay, the human feelings of love, obligation, deference, and judiciousness are thought of by Zhu Xi as the yong of the four human virtues: Ren, righteousness, ritual-propriety, and wisdom. Quite obviously, for Zhu Xi, every virtue has its ti and yong. For example, for Ren, its ti is universal human love which is rooted in the all-encompassing creativity of Heaven and Earth. But its yong is the particular human feeling of love, including, for example, the feeling of commiseration.
(v) The Analects 12:1.
(vi) The Analects 13:19
(vii) This quote is a combination of the Classic of Filial Devotion 孝經, ch. 14 and perhaps Cheng Yi’s teaching on empathy.
(viii) The Analects 7:14
(ix) Bo Yi and Shu Qi are sons of a king in a state during the Shang Dynasty. When their father left the throne to Shu Qi, he declined in deference to his elder brother Bo Yi, but Bo Yi would not violate the order of his father and therefore, chose to flee. Later, when King Wu (r. 1046-1043 B.C.E) overthrew the Shang dynasty in spite of their remonstration, and founded Zhou Dynasty, they would not eat the food of Zhou and starved to death. Their remonstration was arguably unjustified because King Wu’s rebellion was thought of by early Ru as legitimate since it aimed to overthrow a ruthless tyrant, the King Zhou of Shang Dynasty. However, because of the sense of duty that Bo Yi and Shu Qi showed to their father, to each other and to their country, their deeds were almost unanimously praised as being of high moral values by early Ru texts such as the Analects and the Mencius.
(x) The Analects 15:8.
(xi) The Mencius 2A
(xii) Master Cheng refers to Cheng Yi (1033-1107 C.E) or Cheng Hao (1032-1085 C.E), two pioneering Ru philosophers for Song and Ming Ruism who lived in Northern Song Dynasty.
(xiii) Xing (性, nature) and Qing (情, feeling) is another dyad of categories for Ruism. It corresponds to the aforementioned dyads ‘ti-yong’ and ‘li-qi’ in Zhu Xi’s thought. For Zhu Xi, human nature consists in the ti, also the li of the human mind-heart, viz., the four human virtues of Ren, righteousness, ritual-propriety and wisdom. In relation, human feelings are the yong, the manifested functions of vital-energy, of human nature. For Zhu Xi, these two aspects of human existence can never be separated.
(xiv) These two views are perhaps influenced by Buddhism.
(xv) The Analects 6:28.
(xvi) The Analects 6:21
(xvii) The Analects 15:32.
(Figure: A Chart of Ren)
Commentary:
In order to more clearly explain Zhu Xi’s essay, On Ren, I have created The Chart of Ren According to Zhu Xi (please see the below). Through reading the texts and pondering the chart, I believe at least three goals can be achieved for contemporary readers of the Ru tradition: (1) They will understand how the most analytic mind in the Ru tradition thinks of the cardinal human virtue, Ren, 仁. (2) The reading will dissipate their doubt that Ruism may be just a social ethics, without any substantial metaphysical dimension undergirding its ethical teaching. (3) They will understand none of these metaphysical terms or thoughts was borrowed from Daoist or Buddhist traditions, as many stereotypical sayings about Song and Ming Ruism claimed it to be. The truth is that Ruism is a continuous living tradition of “ethical metaphysics” or “metaphysical ethics”, from Kongzi, through Zhu Xi, until now.
With all the rich meanings of terms in mind, I will try my best to explain this chart briefly. In order to understand the chart, Ru learners need to start by following the arrows. Once understood, the chart could be contemplated from anywhere. So, let’s begin:
The nature of Tian is creativity. Creativity means initiation. The initiative power of Tian is manifested in the one of Heaven (Qian) and the one of Earth (Kun). There are four virtues of the creativity of Heaven and Earth: initiation, permeation, harmonization and integration. The virtue of initiation governs them all. These four virtues are manifested in the action of cosmic vital-energy during the course of four seasons. The vital-energy of spring permeates them all.
These four virtues are the principle and living substance of Tian’s creativity, while the four seasons manifest the vital-energy and function of Tian’s creativity. Therefore, for discussing the creativity of Tian, once we say “the initiative power of Qian (heaven), the initiative power of Kun (earth),” then both the four virtues and their functions are encapsulated.
The lower part of the chart is about human beings. It has a parallel structure to the upper section of the chart. Human beings are born from the process of cosmic creativity of Tian. Human nature is embodied in the human mind-heart, and it is the virtue of Ren. There are four virtues for the human mind-heart: Ren, righteousness, ritual-propriety, and wisdom. The virtue of Ren embraces them all. When the human mind-heart is aroused and engages with things, the four virtues of human mind-heart are manifested as four human feelings.
There are two alternative ways to name these four feelings. For Zhu Xi, they are the feelings of love, obligation, deference, and judiciousness. For Mencius, they are the feelings of commiseration, shame and disgust, deference, and distinguishing right and wrong. Using Mencius’s words, these four feelings can be called the four incipient sprouts of human virtues. Zhu Xi’s alternative way to name the feelings derive from Mencius, but is more succinct. One apparent exception is the feeling of obligation, which is different from the one of shame and disgust. However, they are actually based upon the same virtue, righteousness—they connote different aspects of this virtue. When we feel we ought to do something, we have the feeling of obligation; but when we do something we ought not to do, we may feel shamed and disgusted by ourselves. Overall, the feeling of love or commiseration pervades all the other feelings.
The four virtues of human mind-heart are the principle, the substance, the nature and the non-aroused status of human mind-heart. The four human feelings for Zhu Xi and the four moral incipient sprouts for Mencius manifest the vital-force, the function, the feeling, and the aroused status of human mind-heart. Therefore, for discussing the magnificence of the human mind-heart, once we say “Ren, is what the human mind-heart is,” then both its four virtues and their functions are summarized.
Zhu Xi’s essay On Ren illustrates the cosmological root of the cardinal human virtue, Ren. In this sense, his thought could be seen as an ethical metaphysics.
( Translated and Annotated by Bin Song. Edited by Ben Butina.)
This essay has been incorporated into “Significant Figures in Confucianism (Ruism),” in Routledge Research Encyclopedia of Chinese Studies: Chinese Religion and Philosophy, ed. by Zhouxiang Lu (Routeldge, December 2023). A chart is also created for illustrating the concepts of Zhu Xi’s metaphysical ethical system in “On Ren.”
If you feel touched to support this research, you may do so here.
Hallo, this is Dr. Bin Song at Washington College, and I am talking of the Ru style of meditation for varying courses I am offering to the college on the topics of Asian and comparative philosophy, religion, theology and literature.
The ancient Chinese Ru tradition, also named Confucianism in English, experienced its second peak time in the second millennium of imperial China (which is approximately from 9th to 17th century C.E). This period of Ruism is termed as Neo-Confucianism in English. Using its original Chinese self-reference, I’d like to name this period of Ruism as the Daoxue movement (道學). Daoxue means the learning of Dao. Among many new traits of Ruism that the Daoxue movement embodied, the practice of quiet-sitting and other related forms of meditation stand out impressively. As influenced by the Daoist and Buddhist styles of meditation, the Daoxue movement developed its unique Ruist style. This style cares about the holistic well-being of human individuals, advocates social activism, cherishes a this-worldly oriented ethic, and is very friendly to intellectual analysis and integrative learning. In this talk, I’ll use the example of Gao Panlong to illustrate these distinctive traits of Ru Meditation.
In the introductory part of the assigned book “Ru Meditation: Gao Panlong,” I furnished a short biography of Gao Panlong. He was a typical Ru governmental-official who had dedicated his entire career to philosophy, community-building and politics. Among his many venerated philosophical accomplishments, Gao Panlong’s practice and contemplative writing of Ru meditation are particularly influential, and in my view, Gao is among the Ru scholars who has achieved the highest spiritual state of contemplative life in the Ru tradition.
Three traits highlight Gao Panlong (1562-1626)’s contemplative practice and writings:
Firstly, Gao’s understanding of the significance of quiet-sitting evolved throughout his life, and he also furnished rich phenomenological descriptions of his meditative experiences in varying genres of literature such as poetry and prose. For instance, his four five-character poems titled as “Chants for Quiet-Sitting” describes his sitting meditation in the mountains, on the river bank, among the flowers, and beneath the tree. These are really among the best contemplative poems we can find in the Ru tradition.
Secondly, living in the conclusive decades of the Daoxue movement, Gao sought to ritualize Ru meditation in a fixed format of time, place and agenda. For instance, his “A Syllabus for Living in the Mountains” and “Rule for a Seven-Day Renewal” (2018:19-26) describe how he conducts a meditative retreat respectively in a one-day and seven-day format. I once assigned my students at Washington College to come up with their own agendas if they had a chance to organize a spiritual retreat inspired by Gao’s, and the results are just lovely.
Thirdly, in the advanced stage of his contemplative practice, Gao conceived of the goal of Ru meditation as the achievement of “being normal-and-ordinary (pingchang 平常).” Resonating with the Centrality and Commonality (zhongyong 中庸), one of the four Ruist classics canonized by the Daoxue movement, the state of pingchang intends to execute the norm, viz., the varying pattern-principles (理, li) which indicate how diverse factors in a given situation dynamically and harmoniously fit together, in the ordinary moments of everyday life. In other words, a person of pingchang would try to realize the highest spiritual awareness within ordinary moments of their mundane life, such as how to conduct one’s morning routines, how to interact with human fellows in varying relationships, and how to be dedicated to one’s meaningful work for the benefits of oneself and others. In consideration of the prevalence of the emphasis by global traditions over the mysterious and extraordinary nature of meditative experience, the culmination of Gao’s contemplative philosophy in pingchang speaks to the this-worldly oriented spirituality of Ruism exquisitely.
Fourthly, regarding the method of achieving pingchang, Gao (2018:34) says, “in everyday life, whenever we don clothes, put on our hats, or see and meet with one another, we do so with order and decorum. Through this practice, our heartmind (xin 心) gradually trains itself over a long period, and then, just as gradually, it becomes normal-and-ordinary.” In other words, the sustaining practice of “reverence (jing 敬)” towards the appropriately ritualized details of everyday life leads to pingchang. More importantly, Gao thinks that one’s ability of discerning appropriate ritualizations depends upon the final and utmost endeavor of self-cultivation elaborated by the Daxue, viz., “investigation of things (gewu 格物),” since it is only via the investigation of things that the rationales of ritualization, viz., the pattern-principles of things, can be discerned.
The fourth trait highlights the distinction of Gao Panlong’s contemplative lifestyle from previous Ru meditators. In the Daoxue movement, there is a distinction of the lineage of pattern-principle led by Ru exemplars such as Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi (1130-1200) from the lineage of heartmind led by Ru thinkers such as Wang Yangming (1472-1529). There would not be enough time here to elaborate their differences, about which I do encourage you to take on my more advanced level of courses such as the three hundred “Ru and Confucianism.” However, it suffices to say that Cheng-Zhu’s learning style is more externalist, since they predicate their Ru learning upon the investigation of pattern-principles of things in the world. Nevertheless, Wang Yangming’s learning style is more internalist, because Wang thinks the gist of Ru learning consists in recovering the pure moral intuitions which are already within the human heartmind. In Gao’s time, Wang Yangming’s influence was widely felt and kept rising. Gao Panlong, however, systematically refuted the critiques offered by Wang Yangming and Wang’s follows to Zhu Xi, and sought to strengthen the lineage of the Cheng-Zhu learning of pattern-principle. I will raise one instance as follows to illuminate such a distinctive role of Gao in the Daoxue movement. Once again, the following instance has a very dense philosophical context, and if some of my listening students feels it difficult to grasp the essentials of the addressed philosophy, please seek my other courses on Eastern Religions. So, the instance goes on like this:
As mentioned, Wang Yangming believes in the existence of an innate moral capacity of liangzhi, translatable as good knowing or conscientious knowing. In reliance upon the intuitive capacity of liangzhi to grasp pattern-principles of things in the world, Wang Yangming (Chuanxilu: 2) once employed the dictum “no pattern-principle exists outside the heartmind (xinwaiwuli 心外无理)” to repudiate the externalist and intellectualist tendency of Zhu Xi. For Zhu Xi (14 Zhuziyulei 3:298) once insisted that the knowledge of pattern-principles of realities ought to be obtained prior to one’s moral actions towards them. However, to refute Wang’s critique and clarify Zhu’s instruction, Gao Panlong (1773 8a:24) says, “Pattern-principles belong to the heartmind, and it is also up to the heartmind to scrutinize the pattern-principles. However, if the heartmind is not dedicated to scrutinizing (a pattern-principle), we cannot say that the heartmind has possessed the pattern-principle. If a pattern-principle has not been scrutinized, the pattern-principle cannot be deemed as belonging to the heartmind either. … Everything has its own norm endowed by Tian (heaven or the universe), and we humans just need to abstain ourselves so as to treat things as they are in our everyday life.” In other words, Gao agrees with Wang in principle that “no pattern-principle exists outside the heartmind.” However, Gao does not think that the pattern-principles are therefore able to be totally invented by the heartmind. Instead, only when the heartmind invests itself in scrutinizing the pattern-principles of existing things in the world, the ontological reference of “heartmind” can be deemed as equivalent to the one of “pattern-principle.” To highlight this outwardly oriented method of scrutinizing pattern-principles, Gao (1773 8a:3-8) insists that even the pattern-principles of seemingly trivial things such as a blade of grass or a piece of wood (yicaoyiwu 一草一物) ought to be investigated. This is because one would then be aware of how the life-generating power of the universe is concretely manifested in grasses and woods, and the awareness shall connect one to the power so as to nourish their own heartmind (yangxin 养心). This contemplative and self-nourishing attitude towards the investigation of outside things puts Gao’s thought in a direct opposition to Wang Yangming since Wang once famously told (Chuanxilu:120) that he turned into the inward learning of heartmind because he once failed so miserably to investigate the pattern-principle of bamboo trees using Zhu Xi’s method.
In a word, Gao Panlong exemplifies how a Ru meditator is able to do meticulous intellectual work and access the sublime experience of spiritual transcendence simultaneously. For students, scholars and professionals who are either working in or next to the environment of modern universities and colleges of liberal arts, I think such an approach to meditation of Gao Panlong would appear very appealing.
References:
Gao, Panlong 高攀龙. 1773. The Posthumous Works of Master Gao高子遗书. Qin Ding Si Ku Quan Shu Ben 欽定四庫全書本.
——. 2018. Ru Meditation: Gao Panlong (1562-1626). Translated by Bin Song. Boston: The Ru Media Company.
Wang, Yangming 王阳明. 1992. The Complete Works of Wang Yangming 王阳明全集. Shanghai: Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She.
Bin Song 