Hinayana or Nikaya Buddhism: A Short Introduction

Audio: Hinayana or Nikaya Buddhism
Video: Hinayana or Nikaya Buddhism

Hallo, this is Dr. Bin Song at Washington College.

The teaching of the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, was transmitted orally after his demise among Buddha’s followers. It was not until the first century B.C.E that these teachings were codified in written forms, firstly in Pali and then in Sanskrit. However, through reading these codified Buddhist teachings, it is clear to today’s scholars that Buddhism evolved quite a bit after the time of the Buddha. Around the 3rd century B.C.E, there was one flourished type of Buddhist teaching and practice which had been named as “Hinayana Buddhism” by later types of Buddhism. “Hinayana” means “small vehicle,” and compared to “great vehicle,” viz., the Mahayana Buddhism which developed later, Hinayana Buddhism was thought of as one inferior form of Buddhist teaching.

Since being named by its ideological competitor, no affiliate with the so-called “Hinayana Buddhism” would be happy about this name. In fact, this earliest type of Buddhism continues to spread and propagate. It is the origin of the dominate form of Buddhism in contemporary south Asia called “Theravada Buddhism.” Therefore, in order to avoid the sectarian and derogatory word “Hinayana Buddhism,” historians are increasingly inclined to use another more neutral term, “Nikaya Buddhism.” “Nikaya” means “collections,” “groups,” or “schools,” referring to the fact that varying interpretations of Buddha’s teaching existed shortly after his death.

As mentioned, the contemporary form of Nikaya Buddhism is “Theravada Buddhism” in south Asia, and “Theravada” means “the elders.” Named as such, this lineage of Buddhism is not only literally the eldest among all, but quite “conservative” in its philosophy, moral codes and its organizational form.

The teaching of Nikaya Buddhism is highly organized. It parsed out the Four Noble Truths preached by the historical Buddha in almost a Q&A format. For instance, to explain the origin of human sufferings, Nikaya Buddhism propounded two basic existential traits of all beings – impermanence and no-self. For each claim of these traits, it will furthermore provide arguments. Overall, these teachings were used to account for the reality of which human beings are alleged to keep “ignorant,” and therefore, incur a slew of sufferings to themselves.

After the diagnosis of human sufferings, how can we get rid of their causes? The answers given by the texts of Nikaya Buddhism are summarized as “Eightfold Path,” (right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right awareness, and right meditation), which are furthermore divided into three categories: wisdom, moral conducts, and meditation.

If we look into the details of the prescribed moral conducts and meditation, we find that although being centered upon the very charming ethic of universal compassion, these prescriptions are very “other-worldly” oriented, since they champion the monastic life featured by celibacy, moderate asceticism, and intellectual uniformity, and hence, they also doubt the value of family and state life to individuals’ spiritual growth.

Organizationally, compared to the commitment of Mahayana Buddhism to the equal status of lay people and monks regarding their ability to achieve nirvana, the ultimate goal of Buddhist practice, Nikaya Buddhism maintains a more rigid boundary between monks and lay people. The practical ways for normal human beings to achieve nirvana, and thus, be saved from the endlessly tormenting process of samsara seems to be envisioned by Nikaya Buddhism as in such a following process: if you are a normal person in a normal household, and you want to achieve nirvana or simply get a nicer birth in your next life cycle, then, either, you use your own wealth to support a group of monks so that their merits of spiritual achievement can be transferred to your own, or you must leave the household to join them, to become a monk or nun so as to actually practice Buddhism for the purpose of ultimate salvation. Even if you really become a monk or nun, the historical Buddha is for you not a deity; you will mainly rely upon your own teacher in the religious order, the transmitted oral or written Buddhist teachings, and your own efforts to elevate your spiritual strength.

So, why were Nikaya Buddhism and its modern-day offspring of Theravada Buddhism more conservative compared to other forms of Buddhism? Ideologically, it is less speculative, more organized, and in a certain sense, more practical since many of its raised points of thought are like psychi’atric manuals to treat specific diseases of mental health. Morally, it is more stern and ascetic; and organizationally, the rigid boundary between the religious and secular worlds is very visible.

Virtually in all fronts mentioned above, Buddhism appeared to be either revised or enriched by its later development, particularly by varying Mahayana schools that flourished in countries and areas of East Asia such as the ancient China, Tibet, Korea and Japan. However, even so, some fundamental understanding of the historical Buddha’s teaching formed in the period of Nikaya Buddhism remain quite consistent throughout history, such as the starting-point of Buddhist thinking on human suffering, the veneration towards monastic life, the distance from the secular, all-too-human world, etc. In the following, philosophically, I will specify one central point of Nikaya Buddhism and its arguments for it, since beyond the initial treatment of the point by Nikaya Buddhism, I do not find much extra types of argument for it in later Buddhism, and the point is also absolutely crucial for us to understand Buddhist thought in general.

The point made is that nothing has a “self” unrelated to something else, and thus, human sufferings caused by our unfulfilled desires of things-in-themselves are misplaced, since, firstly, there is no such an independent, isolated, “selfed” thing to cause suffering, and secondly, there is no such a “selfed” human to bear sufferings.

There are three major arguments made by the texts of Nikaya Buddhist (as indicated by the assigned reading) to argue for the idea of “no-self”:

  • Firstly, nothing is impermanent, and therefore, no way to define a “self” for anything since all things constantly change.
  • Secondly, each thing comprises of components, and thus, on top of these components, there is no self of this thing. Among the most frequently evoked examples are that apart from parts of a chariot, such as the wheels, yokes, straps, etc., there is no such a thing called “chariot,” and that if you continue to peel away the layered petals of a cabbage, there is really no such a “cabbage” to remain, and therefore, apart from those layered petals, there is no such a selfed thing called “cabbage.”
  • Thirdly, there is a distinctively Buddhist idea called “co-dependent origination,” to imply that all things derive from a process of co-dependent emergence. Therefore, apart from those conditions that originate a thing, the thing cannot exist; in other words, there is no such a “selfed” thing which can exist apart from those conditions upon which it depends. This argument can be thought of as a further development of the second one, since all components of a thing can be seen as belonging to the cluster of conditions that originate a thing.

In a metaphysical approach, these three arguments are actually not that difficult to refute.

  • Firstly, things indeed constantly change. However, for the period that one thing exists, viz., from its birth to death, there is always one way to define its stable character in distinction from other things. For instance, no matter how a tree changes from a seed to a full-shaped being, there is a way to distinguish the tree from other plants during the time when it is alive. Therefore, it is not a legitimate inference from perpetual changes of all beings to the conclusion that one thing cannot be distinguished from another, and thus, cannot have a self.
  • Secondly, components cannot account for the whole existence of a being, since a being is quite often more than the sum of its parts. This is particularly true for organic beings, since beyond all visible parts that comprise a being, it needs an invisible principle, power or simply structure to integrate these components as a whole. A tangible example is a soccer team. Stripped of his or her connection to the team as whole, no soccer player can be a soccer player; however, even if we call on all the needed players to stand in line, this is still not a soccer team, which, in the final analysis, is exactly about how something beyond the discrete soccer players can organize them as a whole. Sometimes we use the phrase “the spirit of a soccer team” to designate the organizing principle or power, which is surely beyond the lump-sum of a bunch of separate players.
  • Thirdly, the fact that all conditions originate the birth of a being does not entail that apart from those conditions, there is nothing new about the generated being. In other words, the generation of a being cannot be reduced entirely and without any remainder to its originating conditions; otherwise, the world is just a repetition of pre-existing conditions, and nothing new will ever take place, which, prima facie, is absurd.

The reason I enumerated my counterarguments above is not intended to deny the value of the Buddhist idea “no-self” all together. Instead, I just want to remind my readers that among traditions of world philosophies and religions, there are varying views of “self.” The Buddhist one may be correct, but in order to defend it, Buddhist thinkers need to confront possible critiques, such as the ones I just raised.

However, according to my knowledge of Buddhism, why it can be so appealing to many practitioners is not mainly because of its sophisticated philosophical arguments. Through the history of Buddhist thought, the practical commitment to releasing humans from suffering is always favored over philosophical sophistication; more importantly, the experiential, salvific approach to meditation is quite often thought of by Buddhists as being more thorough and effective than any philosophical speculation.

Seen from this perspective, it may be up to individuals to decide whether the Buddhist wisdom on “no-self” works; and I would conclude that the teaching may indeed work in the area of individuals’ inner psychology so that the philosophical entanglement with concepts and arguments would be seen by Buddhist practitioners as too off-the-track to be heeded. If this is the case, then, as what many religious traditions in the world turn out to be, the tension between religious practice and philosophy would become, again, visible.

Quiz:

1, what is the language that is the earliest one used by Buddhists to codify Buddhist teachings?

A, Pali
B, Sanskrit

2, Historians today agree that hinayana Buddhism is inferior to Mahayana Buddhism, and hence, it is called “small vehicle.” Is this statement true of false?

3, What are the three categories into which Nikaya Buddhim’s teaching on “Eightfold Path” can be grouped:

A, Wisdom.
B, Moral Conducts
C, Meditation
D, Literature.

4, For what reasons can we see Nikaya Buddhism, the origin of modern Theravada Buddhism, as a more conservative form of Buddhism?

A, it is ideologically more organized and practical.
B, it is morally stern and ascetic.
C, it is organizationally rigid regarding the boundary between lay and monastic people.

5, All aspects of Nikaya Buddhism have been changed by Mahayana Buddhism. Is this statement true or false?

Recommended Reading:

The Development of the Buddhist Canon.